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Abstract 
It is shown by example that learning rules of the fictitious play type fail to converge in 
certain lunds of coordination games. By contrast, learning rules in whch past actions 
are eventually forgotten and whch incorporate small stochastic perturbations are better 
behaved: over the long run, players manage to coordinate with probability one. 
On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games 
Dean Foster and Peyton Young 
Although it is well-known that fictitious play does not converge to a Nash equilibrium 
in general (Shapley, 1964), fictitious play does converge for quite a few games having 
economic significance. These include zero-sum games (Robinson, 1951), two-person 
two-strategy games (Miyasawa, 1961), dominance solvable games (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1991), two-person games with strategic complementarities and diminishing 
returns (Krishna, 1992), and games with identical interests, that is games that are best 
reply equivalent in mixed strategies to a game in which all players have identical payoff 
functions (Monderer and Shapley, 1993a).l 
One might hope that fictitious play also works for coordination games. The reason is 
that coordination games have a natural positive reinforcement property: in a 
neighborhood of every coordination equilibrium every best-reply path gravitates 
toward the equilibrium, while in a neighborhood of any mixed equilibrium there is a 
best-reply path leading away from the equilibrium. We shall show by example, 
however, that t h s  is not sufficient -- even in a coordination game, fictitious play can still 
get trapped in cyclic behavior that is far from equilibrium. 
A finite, two-person game G is a coordimztiotz game if the players have the same number 
of strategies, which can be indexed so that is always a strict Nash equilibrium for both 
players to play strategies having the same index. Thus the payoff matrix has the form 
l = (aij, bij), where 1 5 i 5 n 1 5 j 2 n, and aii > aij , bii > bji for all i and j. 
Consider any infinite sequence of pure strategy pairs S = {(il, jl), ( i ~  j2), . . . (it jt), . . . 1. 
Let pt(S) denote the empirical frequency distribution of the choices {il, i2, . . ., it} up 
through time t, and let qt(S) denote the empirical frequency distribution of the choices 
{ j l ,  j2, . . . , jt} up thought time t. The sequence S is afictitious play sequence if there is 
some t 2 1 such that for every t' > t, it* is a best reply to q t~-~(S)  and j t-  is a best reply to 
For related work see Monderer and Sela (1992), Monderer and Shapley (1993b), Fudenberg and Kreps 
(1993), Kaniovslu and Young (1995). 
P ~ ~ - ~ ( S ) .  The game G has thefictitiotrs plny property if every limit point of every fictitious 
play sequence is a Nash equilibrium (pure or mixed) of G. In the next two sections we 
exhibit coordination games that do not have the fictitious play property. 
2. The doctrines game. 
Two groups of academics periodically announce a position on some matter of scholarly 
doctrine. There are three basic doctrines A, B, and C. Each doctrine has two variants: 
A' and A", B' and B", C' and C". Both groups would like to coordinate on the same 
version of the same doctrine. A sqtrnbble is a situation in which the groups choose 
different versions of the same doctrine. The payoffs are set up so that once a squabble 
begins, the two groups keep shifting position in a way that generates a new squabble. 
Specifically, although both players prefer to coordinate on B' or on B" in preference to an 
A-squabble, Row prefers B' to B" while Column prefers B" to B'. This generates a B- 
squabble. Both prefer C' and C" to a B-squabble, but Row prefers C' to C" while 
Column prefers C" to C', which generates a C-squabble. In short, once the academics 
disagree on the fine points of doctrine, they are unable to reach an agreement on the 
main points. This situation can be represented by the payoff matrix shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Payoff matrix of the doctrines game. 
The strategies D' and D" serve solely as tie-breaking devices; the main action is on the 
remaining six strategies. Consider a fictitious play sequence that begins with Row 
choosing D' and Column choosing DM. In the next period the best replies are D" for 
Row and D' for Column, and the process unfolds as shown below: 
t = 1  2 3 4 5 6 . . . 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 . . . 9 1 9 2 9 3  
Row Dl D" A' A" Bt B" . . . B' B" C' C" . . . C' C" A' . . . 
Column D" D' A A' B" B ' .  . . B" B' C" C' . . . C" C' A" . . . 
Given the initial choices D' and D", Row has a slight preference for prime over double- 
prime whereas Column prefers the reverse. This leads the players to coordinate on the 
same basic doctrine, but never on the same version of that doctrine. Once involved in a 
squabble they try to rectify the situation by imitating what the other did in the previous 
period, whch leads to a new squabble. Thus the process cycles endlessly. 
Theorem 1. Tlle doctri~zes ganze does ?lot llnve tlzefictitiozis ploy properg. 
Proof. Let tk be the number of periods in squabble k. The first three squabbles are of 
length tl = 2, t2 = 14, and t3 = 74. In general, the tk satisfy the following recursive 
equation 
From this it follows that each squabble is about five times as long as the previous one. 
Hence the empirical frequency distribution of strategies ( p t  qt) never converges. 
Afortiori it does not converge to an equilibrium. Indeed, we can show that no limit point 
of the process is close to a Nash equilibrium. Suppose that (p*, q*) is a limit point. 
Then there exist a, p, y such that 
For this to be a Nash equilibrium, we must have a = P = y. But this is not the case, 
because at least one pair of these numbers must be in the ratio of about 5 to 1. 
To prove (1) we proceed by induction on k. For k = 1 the result follows by plugging in 
the values tl = 2, t2 = 14, and t3 = 74. Suppose then that k > 1. Since the game is 
symmetric in A, B, C, and the squabbling proceeds in the cycle A + B -+ C + A, there is 
no loss of generality in assuming that the (k + 2)nd is an A-squabble, the (k + 1)st is a C- 
squabble, and the kth is a B-squabble. To determine which strategy is a best response 
by Row at any given time t, it suffices to compute the hypothetical total payoff (to Row) 
of each strategy, assuming it were played against all previous choices by Column up 
through time t - 1. Call t h s  the score of the strategy at time t. Fictitious play stipulates 
that in each period Row choose some strategy with hghest score. 
Consider the (k + 2)nd squabble, which by assumption is an A-squabble. Each time 
that Column plays A'A" in succession, both A-strategies for Row increase their score by 
24 + 6 = 30, both B-strategies increase their score by 18 + 18 = 36, and both C-strategies 
increase their score by zero. Thus B' gains 6 points relative to A' in every two 
successive periods of an A-squabble. 
Let S A ~  and S B ~  be the scores of A' and B' at the beginning of the current squabble. Let 
[x] denote the least integer greater than or equal to x. Then it takes tk+2 = 
2[(SA0 - SB8)/6] periods for B' to overtake A' (i.e., for B' to become a better reply than A' 
by Row), which ends t h s  squabble and starts the next one. 
It remains to compute the difference SA* - SB~. Consider the first period of the kth 
squabble. At t h s  point, B' has just overtaken A'. Moreover if their scores are S*A' and 
S*B~, then we have 0 < S*B* - S*A~ < 6. (This is because they start period 3 with a 
difference that is less than 6, and all subsequent actions change the scores by multiples 
of 6.) During the ensuing B-squabble, whch lasts for tk periods, A' increases its score 
by 0, B' increases its score by 30tk/2, and C' increases its score by 36tk/2. After this a 
C-squabble commences. This increases the score of A' by 36tk+l/ 2, the score of B' by 0, 
and the score of C' by 30tk+1/2. Thus we have 
S A ~  = 36tk+1/2 + S*A' and S B ~  = 30 tk/2 + S*B~ . (2) 
We may assume by induction that tk and tk+l are even. From (2) it follows that 
We also know that -5 5 (S*AI - S*B') 5 -1. Hence 
[(SA' - SB')/ 61 = 6tk+1/ 2- 5tk/ 2, 
and therefore 
Hence tk+2 is even and formula (1) holds for k, from which it follows by induction that 
(1) holds for all k. This completes the proof of theorem 1. 
We remark that this serves as a counterexample to various other conjectures that one 
might entertain about fictitious play. Consider any finite, two-person game G with 
strategy sets X and Y. A (one-sided) best reply path is a sequence of pairs (XI, yl), (x2, y2) , 
. . ., (xk, yk) such that xi +I is a best reply to xi or y i+ l  is a best reply to yi for 1 5 i < k. G 
is acyclic if no best reply path forms a cycle.2 One might have thought that fictitious 
play converges for acyclic games. Since every coordination game is acyclic, however, 
the above example shows that tlus is not the case. 
3. The merry-go-round game. 
The doctrines game is somewhat delicate, because just a slight perturbation of the 
payoffs would cause the example to fail. Moreover, even if the payoffs are as given, it 
only takes one deviation by one player for the process to get onto a path leading to 
coordination. (If the players manage to coordinate once in the midst of a squabble, the 
squabble will be broken and they will coordinate in all subsequent periods.) The 
question therefore arises whether there are coordination games in which fictitious play 
fails to converge in a more robust sense. 
Consider the following situation. Rick and Cathy are in love, but they are not allowed 
to communicate. Once a day, at an appointed time, they can take a ride on a merry-go- 
round. The merry-go-round has m pairs of horses, where m is odd. Before talung a 
Monderer and Shapley (1988) call this the no-cycling corlditiorlfor the one-sided best reply dylrarnic. Young 
(1993a) considered the class of loenkly ncyclic garnes, which have the property that for any initial pair 
(xl, yl) there exists a one-sided best reply path ending in a sink (i.e., ending in a strict Nash equilibrium). 
ride, each of them chooses one of the m pairs without communicating their choice to the 
other. There are no other riders. If they book the same pair they get to ride side-by- 
side, which is their preferred outcome. If they choose different pairs, their payoffs 
depend on how conveniently they can look at each other. The merry-go-round operates 
clockwise as shown in Figure 1. 
If k c k  chooses pair 1 and Cathy chooses 2, for example, then Rick can see Cathy but she 
cannot easily see him, because the horses all face in the clockwise direction. Say this 
outcome has payoff 4 for k c k  and 0 for Cathy. If they sit side by side they can look at 
each other to their hearts' content (but not talk); this has a payoff of 6. If they are on 
opposite sides of the circle, they can both see each other easily, but the one who has to 
crane h s  neck less has a slightly hgher payoff (5 compared to 4). (They are both stiff- 
necked.) 
Figure 1. The merry-go-round game. 
A similar story can be told for two players who want to coordinate on some date in the 
calendar. Suppose, for example, that two scientific societies hold their meetings once a 
year. Periodically they reconsider the date on which they hold their meetings, and both 
announce the new dates simultaneously without communicating their intentions. There 
are 365 possible dates. Ideally they would like to name the same date, because this 
generates a lot of media coverage about progress in science. (We shall assume their 
memberships are disjoint, so there is no competition for member participation). If one 
society holds its meeting "earlier" than the other, however, it casts a "publicity shadow" 
on the later one. Earlier and later are cyclical concepts: June 1 is earlier than December 
1, whch is earlier than January 1 (of the following year) and so forth. The new meeting 
dates are assumed to remain in place long enough so that there is no appreciable spill- 
over effect when a transition to new dates occurs. Over a period of years, the payoffs 
will have the same general form as in the merry-go-round game. 
Theorem 2. Tlre merry-go-rotllrd game does not lrave tlre fictitiotls play property zolrenever tlze 
lztlnrber ofpositio~rs is odd alrd at least seven. 
Proof. We shall construct an initial sequence, such that fictitious play from that point on 
generates empirical distributions (pb qt) whose limit points are not close to any Nash 
equilibrium of the game. 
Each pair of horses will be called a positiolr. Proceeding clockwise, number the positions 
1, 2, . . . , m, where m = 2k + 1 is odd. Rick (R) is the row player and Cathy (C) is the 
column player. Let the process begin in period 1 with R in position 1 and C in position 
k. We are going to create a sequence of moves of the following form: after a certain 
number of periods tl, C moves to position k + 1. After t2 more periods, R moves to 
position 2. After t3 more periods, C moves to position k + 2, and so forth. In other 
words, R and C alternate in moving clockwise around the circle, with C always k or k + 
1 steps "ahead" of R. Such a sequence is called a clrase. The payoffs from a chase are 
fairly good, because both parties can see each other without craning their necks too 
much. But both would be better off if they sat side-by-side. We shall demonstrate the 
existence of an initial chase (not necessarily generated by fictitious play), such that in 
every subsequent period, fictitious play continues the chasead ilzfinittlnr. 
Let the initial chase be represented by the sequence ti, t2, . . ., tj, . . ., where tj is the 
number of consecutive periods that the process spent in a situation where neither R nor 
C moved. We shall call this stage j of the chase. Assume that when j is even, R will be 
the next to move, whereas when j is odd, C will be the next to move. A cycle is a 
sequence of 2m stages that takes the players once around the circle. 
Let us focus on some stage j, which without loss of generality we can suppose is even. 
Assume that we are in the last period of the current stage. In the next period, R will 
move clockwise one step and stay there for tj+l periods. For this move to be generated 
by fictitious play, it must be R's best reply to the history. To compute the best reply, 
refer to table 2, which shows the last 14 stages of the most recent cycle within the payoff 
matrix for the case m = 7. 
Table 2. 
Let us adopt the tie-breaking convention that a player moves one position to the right as 
soon as that position has an equal or lugher payoff to his current position. Thus, in the 
above cycle, R moves as soon as the second row has at least as high an expected payoff 
as the first row, that is, as soon as 
where 6 involves all terms tj-14 and earlier. Ths  is equivalent to 
In the period just before this one, R did not move to the right, so the above expression 
with tj-1 substituted for tj must be less than zero. It follows that it exactly equals zero 
now, that is, 
Observe that Tj periods ago, R was faced with the same choice that he is now, and he 
moved right. Therefore, Tj periods ago, the payoff difference between staying put and 
moving right must have been exactly equal to zero, which implies that 5 = 0. We 
conclude that, iffictitiozis play has generated a chase for the last 2 m  stages, and i f i t  continties 
to generate a clzasefronr stage j on, then the following reczlrsive equation lrolds: 
In the general case m = 2k + 1, the analogous equation is 
Lemma 1. Let m = 2k + 1, where k 2 3, and let j* 2 2m. Suppose that the following two 
relations hold for all j, 3 I j < j*: 
tj > 2tj-2 (4) 
Suppose further that (3) holds for j = j*, j*-1, . . . , j* - 6. Then (4) and (5) hold for j = j*. 
Proof. The recursive equation (3) is easier to work with if we write it down as a table of 
coefficients: 
j j-1 j-2 . . . j-2k+l j-2k j-2k-1 j-2k-2 . . . j-2m+3 j-2m+2 j-2m+l 
O=-1 1 1  0 -2 -2 6 6 0 -4 -4 - 1 .  
Let j = j* and assume that (4) and (5) hold for 3 5 j < j*. Assume further that k 2 4. 
(We shall deal separately with the case k = 3.) In this case, 4-2 is at least four stages 
ahead of tj-2k+l, so tj-2 > 4tj-2k+l. Furthermore, tj-2k+ 1 > t j - 2 ~  SO 
By condition (2), the terms 6tj-2k-1 + 6tj-2k-2 outweigh the last three negative terms. 
Putting all of this together we conclude that tj > tj.1, so that (5) holds for j. 
Next we shall show that tj > 2tj-2. By assumption the recursive equation holds for j - 1 
as well as j. Adding the resulting two equations we obtain 
By assumption, the last equation applies for j - 3 as well as j, so 
j . . .  j-2m-3 
O=-1 0  2 1 0  0  O . . . - 2  -4 4  12 6  0  0  O. . . -4  - 8 - 5 - 1 0  0  0  
Adding this to the bottom line of the preceding table we obtain 
From the assumption that (4) and (5) hold for j < j*, it follows that the sum of the terms 
in A is strictly positive. Similarly, the sum of the terms in B are strictly positive. Since 
all other terms are positive, we conclude that tj > 24-2 as claimed. 
Next we need to dispose of the case k = 3. Using the same substitution procedure as 
above, we obtain the following analog of (6): 
Take three times the analogous equation for j - 6  and subtract it from the above to obtain 
By the doubling property, tj-11 > 8tj-17, and tj-11 > 4tj-15. Hence 
By the doubling property, tj-8 > 8tj-14, SO 4tj-8 - 35tj-14 > -3tj-14. Similarly, 4tj-7 - 17tj-13 
>>15tj-13. By monotonidty, tj-13 > 4-14. from which it follows that 
Since all other terms are positive, we conclude that tj > 2tj-2 which completes the proof 
of Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1 shows in particular that if a sequence tl, tz . . ., tj*, . . . is generated from some 
point j* 2 2m on by equation (3), and if the initial sequence is strictly monotone 
increasing and satisfies the doubling property, then the whole sequence has these two 
properties. 
To complete the proof of the theorem, we need to establish that given a suitable initial 
sequence, fictitious play generates all subsequent stages tj according to the recursive 
equation (3). This will follow if, whenever a player moves under fictitious play, he 
always moves one position clockwise. In other words, we need to show that if the 
clockwise position has the same or higher expected payoff than the current position, 
then no other other position can have a still hgher expected payoff. For this it suffices 
to show that coordinating with the other player's most recent move never offers a 
higher expected payoff than staying put or moving one position clockwise. (It is 
straightforward to check that if coordinating is inferior to moving one position 
clockwise, then all other moves are inferior to moving one position clockwise.) 
Coordination has the highest payoff relative to other strategies when some player has 
occupied the same position for a long time, since this creates the strongest incentive for 
the other player to imitate him (or her). Thus the crucial point to check is the 
attractiveness of coordination wlzelz some player has just conzpleted two  stages ilz tlze same 
positio~z. Without loss of generality, consider the situation at the end of an even stage j: 
R has occupied the same position for tj + tj-1 periods, and is about to move. (This 
situation is depicted in table 2.) C does not have an incentive to coordinate with R if 
and only if the following inequality holds: 
Note that we are omitting all stages older than the last complete cycle. This is sufficient, 
because if the inequality holds now, and it held 2m stages ago, 2m stages before that, 
and so forth, then it must hold now with all previous stages included. In particular, if a 
sequence satisfies the recursive equation (3) and inequality (8) for all j 2 j* 2 2m, then 
from stage j on fictitious play will generate precisely h s  sequence. 
Lemma 2. Suppose that doubling (4) and monotonicity (5) hold for all j', 3 I j' I j and (3) 
holds for j and j - 1. Then (8) holds for j. 
Proof. By assumption, the recursive equation holds for j and j - 1. Adding these 
equations to inequality (8) results in the equivalent inequality shown below: 
We shall show that the last row is positive, from which it will follow that the first row is 
positive, that is, inequality (8) holds for j. To prove that the last row is positive, we 
need to show that each of the negative terms in the bottom row is dominated by some 
combination of positive terms to the left. We shall refer to these terms by the values of 
their coefficients. By the doubling property, the -23 term is dominated by the 8 term, 
which is two periods ahead, plus the 4 term, which is four periods ahead. The -17 is 
dominated by the 6, which is four periods ahead. The first -4 is dominated by the first 2. 
Each subsequent -4 in the second ellipsis is dominated by the corresponding 4 in the 
first ellipsis. (Note that this argument applies for k = 3 as well as k > 3.) This 
completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
To complete the proof of the theorem, we shall demonstrate an initial sequence 
1 ,  2 ,  . . . tj* , j* = 2m+2, such that: i) tj satisfies the recursive equation for 3 5 j I j* 
(truncated if necessary to the number of preceding terms); ii) monotonicity and 
doubling hold for 3 l j I j*. 
Let fictitious play be allowed to run beginning in period T = ti + t2 + . . . + tj* + 1. By 
Lemma 2 we know that inequality (8) holds for j*. Hence C has no incentive to move. 
Assume without loss of generality that j* is even (so that R is about to move). Since the 
recursive equation holds for tj*-zm-, R was indifferent between staying put and moving 
clockwise one step at the end of t h s  stage. Since the recursive equation holds for j*, he 
is also indifferent now. Thus the tie-breaking rule implies that R does in fact move one 
step clockwise in period T. Both players stay in their positions for tj*+l periods, that is, 
until C is indifferent between staying put and moving one step clockwise. This happens 
when the value of tj*+ 1 is determined by the recursive equation. From Lemma 1 it 
follows that monotonicity and doubling hold for 3 I j I j* + 1. Thus properties i) and ii) 
hold for the sequence tl, t2, . . ., ti*+ 1. Inductively, we conclude that fictitious play 
generates an infinite chase tl, t2, . . ., tj*, . . where all terms beginning with t3 are 
determined by the recursive equation. 
Now consider the empirical distributions (pt qt) generated by such a chase. Because of 
monotonicity and the doubling property, any limit point of the process also is 
monotonic and has the doubling property. But such a point cannot be close to any Nash 
equilibrium of the game. 
It remains to actually demonstrate the required sequence. For this purpose let us fix 
k = 3 and m = 7. (The construction is quite general however.) Fix any pair of positions 
on the circle in which R is 3 steps ahead of C. This will be the starting point for the 
chase. Let tl = 1 and t2 = 2. Let each subsequent ti be generated by the recursive 
equation for k = 3, truncated to the existing number of preceding terms. This 
guarantees indifference on the part of the player about to move next. Recall that this 
equation is 
Note that t h s  is a coordination game, and that strategies 1-7 for the two players are the 
same as in the merry-go-round game. Let the process start in period one with the 
strategy choices (a, P). It can be verified that, beginning in period 3, fictitious play 
generates a chase with the following stage-lengths: 
stage 
- 
- 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
strategy pair 
(a,  P) 
(P, a) 
(1, 4) 
(1, 5) 
(2,5) 
(2,6) 
(3,6) 
(3,7) 
(4,7) 
(4,U 
(5,U 
(5,2) 
( 6 2 )  
( 6 3 )  
(7,3) 
(7,4) 
(1, 4) 
(1, 5) 
(2,5) 
(2,6) 
(3,6) 
(3,7) 
number of periods 
1 
1 
8 
14 
23 
54 
78 
133 
216 
297 
453 
709 
1196 
1968 
3307 
5703 
9442 
15284 
24472 
39162 
62413 
99719 
The recursive equation is satisfied beginning at stage 15, that is, tj is given by the 
recursive equation for all j 2 15. Unlike the situations analyzed earlier, there is not 
perfect payoff indifference at the end of each stage between staying put and moving 
clockwise one step (because of the noninteger payoffs attached to a and P ) .  
Nevertheless, there is near-perfect indifference, and the number of periods in each stage 
is determined by the same equation as before. It can be verified that the numbers in the 
initial sequence are strictly increasing and more than double every two periods. It 
follows as in Lemmas 1 and 2 that fictitious play generates an infinite chase beginning at 
stage 15. 
4. Modifications of fictitious play 
The above examples do not show that coordination games in general are hard to learn, 
but they do show that some are harder to learn than others. More importantly, fictitious 
play is not the best way to learn them. Fictitious play has two defects as a learning rule: 
i) it does not contain enough randomization to escape from unproductive learning 
paths, and ii) it has too much inertia, that is, it puts too much weight on moves in the 
distant past. To deal with the latter problem, we could truncate fictitious play by 
having the players only react to the frequence distributions of the last m periods, where 
m is a (large) positive integer. It can be shown, however, that this is not enough to 
achieve convergence: indeed, there are 2 x 2 coordination games in which, for any m, 
the players miscoordinate forever if they miscoordinate in the first period (Fudenberg 
and Kreps, 1993; Young, 1993). 
Better results are obtained if there is some "noise" in the learning process. One way to 
introduce stochastic variation is to suppose that the players have incomplete 
information about what the others have done in the past. Assume that in each period 
t > 1, each agent draws a random sample of size k without replacement from the last m 
plays. (If t < k, we can assume that all previous plays are sampled.) The draws are 
independent for the two agents. Each agent then chooses a best reply to the empirical 
frequency distribution in lus sample. Once a given coordination equilibrium has been 
played m times in succession, it is played forever because the sampling in this case 
yields no deviation from the equilibrium. In other words, m successive repetitions of a 
coordination equilibrium is an absorbing state of the learning process. It can be shown 
further that these are the only absorbing states of the process. Moreover, if the ratio of 
information k/m is sufficiently svznll (in particular if k /m 5 1/2), the process converges 
with probability one to an absorbing state, that is, a coordination equilibrium will 
eventually be played with probability one (Young, 1993, Theorem 1). The reason this 
works is that the stochastic variability created by incomplete sampling eventually jostles 
the process out of uncoordinated cycles. Once the process hits an absorbing state, 
however, the sampling variability vanishes and the process stays there forever. 
Similar results obtain under other lunds of stochastic perturbation. Suppose, for 
example, that there is some systematic "error" in the players' responses. Let 6 be a 
small positive number. Suppose that with probability 1 - 6 a given agent chooses a best 
reply to the frequency distribution of the other side's actions in a random sample drawn 
from the truncated history, but with probability 6 she chooses a strategy at random. 
The probabilities of these events are independent for the two agents. We then obtain a 
Markov process ~6 on the finite state space H consisting of all truncated histories. The 
process is ergodic because there is a positive probability of moving from any state to 
any other in m periods or less. It can be shown that, for all sufficiently small 6, the 
players play a coordination equilibrium with near certainty over the long run. More 
precisely, given the process ~ 6 ,  let 9 6  be the long-run probability that the jth 
coordination equilibrium (xi, xj) is played in any given period t as t + m. This 
probability exists because the process is aperiodic and ergodic. It can be shown that, 
given any E > 0, xj=l,n 9 6  t 1 - E for all sufficiently small 6 (Young, 1993).3 In other 
words, the probability is at least 1 - E that over the long run the players coordinate at 
any given time. Furthermore, in the absence of ties (i.e., in a generic coordination 
game), it can be shown that the players coordinate almost all of the time on exactly one of 
the coordination equilibria when the noise 6 is small.4 
Kaniovski and Young (1995) analyze a learning model in which there is sampling and 
systematic error, but the history is not truncated and all past plays are given equal 
weight. They show that, for 2 x 2 games, such a model converges with probability one 
to a neighborhood of a Nash equilibrium. They show further that for 2 x 2 coordination 
games, the process converges with probability one to a coordination equilibrium.5 We 
conjecture that this type of learning model does not converge for the merry-go-round 
game, though we shall not attempt to prove t h s  here. More generally, we conjecture 
that both random perturbations and finite memory (or sufficiently rapid discounting) 
are necessary conditions for a learning rule to converge with probablity one to a 
coordination equilibrium in a general coordination game. 
3 ~ a n d o r i  Mailath and Rob (1993) prove a similar result for symmetric 2 x 2 coordination games. 
4~imi lar  esults hold for games that are zvenkly acyclic in the sense that, from any initial pair (XI, x2) there 
is a sequence of best replies (one player at a time) that ends in a strict Nash equilibrium (Young, 1993). 
5 ~ h i s  generalizes results of Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), who show that similar types of learning 
processes converge with probability one to a neighborhood of the mixed equilibrium provided the game 
has a unique equilibrium, which is mixed (in particular, the game is not a coordination game). 
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